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BAD SCIENCE, WORSE POLICY: THE EXCLUSION OF GAY 
MALES FROM DONOR POOLS 
JOHN G. CULHANE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is axiomatic that those responsible for public health policy often face 
difficult hurdles in gaining compliance with their initiatives.1  Coercion is one 
tool for achieving such compliance, but is a last and limited resort.2  For the 
most part, public health officials must rely on an artistic combination of 
education, intervention, and – critically – buy-in from the public they serve.3  
To the extent that trust between public health and the population is 
compromised, so too is the ability of government to achieve favorable 
outcomes.4 
Often the problem that public health encounters is not of its own making.  
Other governmental actors, as well as private forces, have too often behaved in 
ways that historically discriminate against subgroups of the population 
successfully consigned to the margins: people of color;5 prostitutes;6 women;7 
 
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; Lecturer, Yale University School of 
Public Health.  I would like to extend more than the usual acknowledgment to my research 
assistants, Nancy Bourke and Kenny Levine.  Both did an excellent job under intense time 
pressure, and this article could not have been completed in a timely way without them. 
 1. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of Infectious 
Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 94-95 (1999). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. at 120. 
 4. For a sharp summary of this point, see LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: 
DUTY, POWER, RESTRAINT 107-09 (2000). 
 5. The most infamous and most-often mentioned example of public health’s own 
mistreatment of minority groups is the CDC-supported Tuskegee study of the course of syphilis 
infection in African-Americans who were neither told of the study nor offered antibiotics from 
the early 1930s until 1972.  See id. at 124 (also citing other examples).  See also Allan M. Brandt, 
Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21, 
21-29 (1978), reprinted in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 312-19 (Lawrence O. 
Gostin ed., 2002). 
 6. During the early part of the twentieth century, prostitutes and “those associated with 
them” were often regarded as vectors for the transmission of sexually transmissible diseases and 
subject to confinement.  See, e.g., Ex parte Company, 139 N.E. 204, 204 (Ohio 1922).  
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and, with special relevance to this article, the gay/lesbian/bi-
sexual/transgendered (“GLBT”) community.8  Thus, those responsible for 
public health face a wall of skepticism that they may not have been involved in 
creating.  But some public health actors make a tough situation intractable by 
being part of the problem.  As a first principle, public health must not act to 
fuel the fire of distrust, especially in minority communities, by acting in ways 
that can fairly be characterized as bigoted or illogical.  This behavior erodes 
the fragile, and always contingent, trust that public health relies on to do its 
job.  And there is no more important function of government than to safeguard 
the public’s health. 
Governmental policy towards the GLBT community has often been 
inimical to the very goals it purports to serve.  It has been unsupported by 
scientific research or basic logic, and is explainable only by unfounded 
assumptions about the citizens that government is supposed to serve.9  Public 
health officials have sometimes compounded the problem by standing on the 
wrong side of the issue, seemingly (or obviously) bowing to political pressure 
in enacting bad policy.  This article explores two closely related, egregious 
instances of such wrong-headed policy-making: the exclusion of virtually all 
gay men from both the eligible pools of blood donors and anonymous sperm 
donors. While these exclusions stem primarily from the fear of HIV 
infection,10 they are not justified by it. 
Both of these exclusionary policies sweep more broadly than justified by 
any reasonable reading of scientific literature.  Any man who has had “sex” 
with any other man, even once, since 1977, is forever excluded from giving 
blood.11  The blood policy, discussed more fully in Part II, contributes to the 
critical shortage of available blood for transfusion.  Further, because the 
exclusion is not justified by consistently applied epidemiological principles, it 
 
Meanwhile, the men who had sex with them, and who often passed disease to their unsuspecting 
wives, went largely unpunished. 
 7. Pregnant women, in particular, have too often been seen as vessels rather than as persons 
with rights of their own.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2500(f) (2004) (1996 law mandating 
HIV testing of newborns; because of maternal antibodies in newborns, test actually tests mother 
without her consent); Brandt, supra note 5, at 319-20 (criticizing use of placebo drugs on 
pregnant women when efficacy of drug to prevent HIV transmission from mother to fetus had 
already been demonstrated). 
 8. See infra notes 112-118 and accompanying text. 
 9. As Professor Gostin has succinctly stated: “[S]creening is political – elected officials 
perceive some groups as blameworthy and some as innocent.” GOSTIN, supra note 4, at 201. 
 10. Obviously, HIV is not the only blood-borne pathogen that concerns policy makers. 
Hepatitis is also sexually transmissible, as are a host of other diseases.  But most of the concern 
has focused on HIV, and a discussion of other sexually transmitted diseases is beyond the scope 
of this article. 
 11. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
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feeds the notion that gay men are inherently dangerous carriers of disease.  
This perception is detrimental to gay men in two related ways: First, it erodes 
self-esteem and contributes to a climate in which other kinds of discrimination 
are more easily justified.  Second, the policy is so plainly absurd that it risks 
being ignored by gay men who should self-defer.12 
Part III of this article describes and criticizes a more recent policy decision 
by public health officials that makes similar unsupported assumptions about 
gay men and their presumed status as HIV carriers.  The Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) has determined, after a protracted period of time, to 
consider and respond to comments that men who have had sex with men, even 
once during the past five years, are to be excluded from anonymous sperm 
donation.13  Given the shrinking window period during which the HIV virus 
might go undetected, and the need to test donated sperm both at the time of 
donation and six months later (after the sperm have been frozen),14 this policy 
is also bereft of justification.  I argue that the FDA’s efforts to justify the 
exclusion are opaque and inconsistent with the treatment of other putative 
donors. 
Part IV stands back a bit from these specific policies to place governmental 
action towards the GLBT community in a broader context.  Focusing on two 
examples from rather different places on the political map, I argue that 
government policies too often contribute to a confusing and demonizing 
portrait of an entire community of people.  I offer suggestions for a more sober 
approach to the issue of safety in the donor context, an approach that could 
safeguard the blood and sperm supply at a level deemed adequate in other 
contexts by recognizing true risks and responding only to those. 
II.  “PROTECTING” THE BLOOD SUPPLY THROUGH THE LIFETIME DEFERRAL OF 
MEN WHO HAVE SEX WITH MEN 
It may be difficult to recall the fear and panic that HIV infection created in 
the early 1980s.  In that crucible, ill-informed public health policies were 
inevitable.15  Indeed, it was not even until 1985 that a reliable test for 
 
 12. In Part IV, I make some preliminary suggestions for a screening process that might do a 
better job of persuading at-risk donors to opt out. 
 13. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
 15. For example, public health stumbled around in search of sound policy when faced with 
the difficult question of whether to close the gay bathhouses at the beginning of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.  The problem is explored from a number of perspectives in GAY BATHHOUSES AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY (William J. Woods & Diane Binson eds., 2003), reviewed in John G. 
Culhane, Sex, Fear, and Public Health Policy, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 
(forthcoming 2004). 
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antibodies to the HIV virus was developed.16  Because the AIDS crisis was 
seen, with justification, as disproportionately affecting the gay male 
community, the FDA sought to permanently exclude all sexually active gay 
men from the blood donor pool.17 
Incredibly, enormous advances in HIV testing, epidemiological and 
biological research into the transmission of the virus, and a safe blood supply 
have not caused this lifetime donor deferral policy to change.18  In this section, 
I discuss the source of authority and origin of the donor deferral policy, and 
examine a somewhat recent re-evaluation of the policy.  In 2000, the FDA’s 
Blood Products Advisory Committee recommended leaving the lifetime 
deferral in place.19  Its reasons for doing so cannot be justified. 
Blood and other bodily organs, tissue, and fluids come within the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the FDA.20  Because the FDA is charged with 
licensing blood banks,21 it is responsible for creating safeguards to minimize 
the risk that blood infected with infectious diseases, such as HIV, will find its 
 
 16. A layperson’s account of the early history of HIV/AIDS, that mentions the development 
of the antibody test, can be found at AVERT.ORG, THE HISTORY OF AIDS: 1981-1986, at 
http://www.avert.org/his81_86.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 17. In 1983, the FDA recommended donor-screening procedures to exclude individuals at 
increased risk for transmitting HIV.  The document that gave official imprimatur to the lifetime 
exclusion of MSM was issued in 1992.  FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY 
VIRUS (HIV) TRANSMISSION BY BLOOD AND BLOOD PRODUCTS 3 (1992), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ cber/bldmem/hiv042392.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter 
REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS].  Since then, the exclusion of potential donors based on sexual 
histories has been discussed often, and in-depth, by the FDA’s Blood Products Advisory 
Committee (“BPAC”).  This panel of non-FDA independent experts continues to recommend the 
permanent “deferral” (i.e., exclusion) of men who have sex with other men.  According to the 
FDA, although a potential individual donor may practice safe sex, persons who have participated 
in high-risk behaviors are, as a group, still considered to be at increased risk of transmitting HIV.  
The BPAC met on Sept. 14-15, 2000 to revisit this issue. After much discussion, the BPAC 
recommended that men who had sex with other men since 1977 continue to be deferred from 
donating blood.  See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text for a critical discussion of this 
recommendation. 
 18. See Becky Orfinger, FDA Committee Votes Against Relaxing Donor Ban (2000), at 
http://www.redcross.org/news/archives/2000/9-15-00b.html (last viewed Nov. 17, 2004).  See 
also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BLOOD FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS (FAQS), at http://www.fda.gov/cber/faq/bldfaq.htm (last modified Mar. 15, 2004). 
 19. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
 20. Authority vested in the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 361 of the 
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 264) includes the law enforcement functions of the FDA.  
These functions concern, among other subjects, blood and blood products, and have been re-
delegated by the Secretary to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs.  21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(3) 
(2004). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262 (West 2004). 
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way into a recipient body.22  To that end, the FDA has established a battery of 
requirements relating to the licensing of blood banks,23 the testing of blood 
prior to its release,24 and – with particular relevance here – the eligibility of 
donors.25 
Some donor requirements are non-controversial, such as those relating to 
the frequency with which an individual may donate26 and to general donor 
“good health.”27  But the FDA has established a battery of additional 
exclusions.  The Guide to Inspections of Blood Banks of 199428 adds to the list 
of conditions requiring donor deferral, and references another document, 
entitled Revised Recommendations for the Prevention of HIV Transmission by 
Blood and Blood Products (“Revised Recommendations”).29  The Revised 
Recommendations, in turn, call for lifetime deferral of several large categories 
of donors, including “men who have had sex with another man even one time 
since 1977.”30  In structuring the language of deferral in this way, the Revised 
Recommendations claim to be focusing on “behavior and not on 
stereotypes.”31  Thus, “many men who have had male-to-male sexual 
experiences do not identify themselves as ‘homosexual,’ ‘gay,’ or ‘bisexual,’ 
but would identify with the description ‘sex with another man.’”32 
The Revised Recommendations’ drafters were correct to note that 
describing behavior is a better means of achieving public policy goals than 
 
 22. The FDA exercises this authority through the Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research (“CBER”), which has responsibility for regulating blood and blood products, as well as 
other biological products.  CBER’s responsibilities in this regard derive from section 351 of the 
Public Health Service Act and from specific sections of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.  CTR. 
FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ABOUT US, at 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/about.htm (last modified July 7, 2004). 
 23. See 21 C.F.R. § 606.100 (2004); 42 U.S.C.A. § 262 (West 2004). 
 24. See 21 C.F.R. § 610.40 (2004); id. § 640.5. 
 25. See id. § 1271.50. 
 26. Id. § 640.3(b). 
 27. Id. 
 28. OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS & THE CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & 
RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDE TO INSPECTIONS OF BLOOD BANKS, at 
http://www.fda.gov/ora/inspect_ref/igs/blood.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 29. REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 17. 
 30. Id. at 3.  The recommendations also exclude, among other categories of potential donors, 
“[p]ast or present intravenous drug users,” “[m]en and women who have engaged in sex for 
money or drugs since 1977,” “[p]ersons who have had sex with any person meeting the above 
descriptions during the preceding 12 months,” “[p]ersons who have had, or have been treated for, 
syphilis or gonorrhea during the preceding 12 months . . . ,” and “[p]ersons born in or emigrating 
from countries where heterosexual activity is thought to play a major role in transmission of HIV-
2 infection . . . and persons who have had sex with any [such emigrating] person.”  Id. at 3-4. 
 31. Id. at 2. 
 32. Id. 
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using labels, but the irony is that the FDA’s “men who have sex with men” 
category simply substitutes one harmful stereotype with another.  By looking 
at sexual conduct as far back as 1977 – by this point, some twenty-seven years 
ago – the FDA is well outside of any consideration of etiologically relevant 
behavior and back into the very type-casting it purported to avoid.  A closer 
look at the approved laboratory testing for HIV, coupled with the recent debate 
among members of the FDA’s Blood Products Advisory Committee 
(“Advisory Committee”) about whether to modify this absurdly overbroad 
exclusion, reveals the deficiency in the FDA’s approach to this issue. 
Inasmuch as all donated blood is tested under strict, FDA-mandated 
conditions before being used,33 there are only two plausible ways in which 
infected blood could find its way into a recipient.  First, an infected unit of 
blood could be accidentally released.34  Second, there is a short “window 
period” in which a person’s HIV infection is not detectable through approved 
testing methods.35  Advances in testing have reduced this window period to 
under a month in most cases,36 but the window remains open, if only a crack. 
These two facts were central to the debate among Advisory Committee 
members during their meeting in late 2000 to consider whether the lifetime 
exclusion of “men who have sex with men” (“MSM”) was too broad.37  On the 
table was a proposal to shorten the relevant behavioral period from pre-1977 to 
the past five years.38  Thus, a prospective donor would only be excluded under 
the MSM category if he answered “yes” to the question: “Have you had sex 
with another man within the past five years?” 
 
 33. See supra note 24. 
 34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1271.65(a) (West 2004) (delineating storage procedures for 
specimens from donors determined to be ineligible so as to prevent improper release). 
 35. According to the FDA, “Studies have shown that up to 2 months may elapse between the 
time of infection and the time the HIV antibody test is reactive.”  FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BLOOD FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS), at 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/faq/bldfaq.htm (last modified Mar. 15, 2004). 
 36. Since 2002, the routine use of nucleic acid testing (“NAT”) for the HIV virus itself 
(rather than its antibodies) has even further reduced the risk of transfusion transmission of HIV to 
about one unit per two million donations.  Id.  Nonetheless, “[w]hile HIV nucleic acid 
amplification assays are now extremely sensitive and can reliably detect HIV by days 9-11 of 
infection . . . , they are vulnerable to false-positive rates as high as 1%.  Such tests remain 
relatively expensive and have not traditionally been used for routine clinical HIV screening.”  
Christopher D. Pilcher et al., Acute HIV Revisited: New Opportunities for Treatment and 
Prevention, 113 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 937, 937 (2004) (footnote omitted), available at 
http://www.jci.org/ cgi/reprint/113/7/937.pdf. 
 37. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., BLOOD PRODUCTS ADVISORY COMM. 67TH MEETING 159 (Sept. 14, 2000), 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/00/transcripts/3649t1.rtf [hereinafter ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE 67TH MEETING]. 
 38. Id. at 158, 164, 201. 
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The Advisory Committee voted against the proposed change by the 
narrowest of margins (7-6).39  The two primary blood banks stood on opposite 
sides of the debate; the American Association of Blood Banks (“AABB”) 
supported the relaxed requirement, while the American Red Cross (“Red 
Cross”) opposed it.40  Dr. Dayton, who argued in support of the change, argued 
persuasively that the five-year deferral period would be so far outside the 
testing window that the proposed policy would introduce no new cases of 
infection.41 
The sticking point was the possibility of erroneous introduction of an 
infected unit of blood into the supply.42  Dr. Dayton’s epidemiological analysis 
considered the prevalence of HIV infection in the MSM community and the 
number of additional donors who could be expected to enter the donation pool 
if the requirement were relaxed.43  This number was then multiplied by the 
incidence of errors that might be expected, yielding a finding that changing the 
policy to a five-year deferral for MSM might result in a total of 1.7 infectious 
units per year entering the blood supply.44 
The Red Cross took a “zero tolerance” approach, and stated that it would 
not support any change in policy that would add any risk, however small, to 
the blood supply.45  From its perspective, this orientation towards risk might 
seem logical – although even the Red Cross should consider the risk of blood 
shortages that might continue in the absence of this potential donor pool.  
Government officials, however, have a different responsibility: to treat like 
risks alike.  As one participant at the Advisory Committee meeting stated: 
“[T]he current donor deferral policy tolerates a wide range of risks associated 
with heterosexual sex while imposing a zero tolerance attitude towards MSM 
regardless of the risk associated with individual behavior.”46 
This criticism is on the mark.  A highly sexually active female, for 
example, would present a greater risk to the blood supply than a gay man who 
might be in a monogamous relationship, and whose understandable concern 
with his HIV status might have led him to be tested a number of times (with 
negative results).  Further, the finding that relaxing the deferral requirement 
down to a still-too-long five years could increase the number of infected units 
by under two units per year,47 even if true, arrives at that conclusion by asking 
 
 39. Id. at 311-12. 
 40. Id. at 250, 259, 284. 
 41. Id. at 214-15, 218. 
 42. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE 67TH MEETING, supra note 37, at 205, 215. 
 43. Id. at 204-05. 
 44. Id. at 210-11. 
 45. Id. at 256-58. 
 46. Id. at 252. 
 47. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE 67TH MEETING, supra note 37, at 211. 
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the wrong question.  Any change in the deferral policy that increases the 
number of donors is, ipso facto, going to increase the number of infected 
units.48  In a twist that is sadly familiar to members of the GLBT community, 
the continued exclusion is an artifact of a policy that was too exclusionary in 
the first place.  Now that same policy is used to ground arguments against any 
change.  The fact that other nations employ a similarly broad exclusion is no 
justification for the practice.49 
To understand the fallacy of such thinking, consider a different example.  
Imagine that HIV had first taken hold in the heterosexual population, and that 
an early policy had excluded anyone who had had certain kinds of sexual 
contact with a member of the opposite sex since 1977.  Obviously, by bringing 
millions of people back into the donor pool, a change to such policy would 
result in some increase in the number of HIV-infected units.  It is impossible, 
though, to imagine that this increased risk would be successfully used against 
changing the policy in such an obviously rational direction.  On the other hand, 
intravenous drug users have been excluded from the start,50 and it seems likely 
that a change of policy along the one narrowly rejected for MSM would also 
be rejected. 
Of course, part of the reason for the difference is that the numbers of MSM 
and intravenous drug users are far smaller than the number of heterosexually 
active adults, so society can “afford” the continued exclusion in the former 
classes of cases.  But no one who has observed government actions toward the 
gay community, or toward those with substance addiction problems, can 
honestly discount the effect of discrimination against these groups in the 
formulation of policy. 
Finally, note that the exclusion does not define “sex.”  This lack of 
specificity creates two related problems.  First, the potential donor is left to 
define for himself what the term means.  In the context in which the test is 
administered, at least some gay male donors could well assume that the 
question is concerned with only the riskiest behavior: unprotected (perhaps 
passive) anal intercourse.51  The inconsistency resulting from this “define it 
 
 48. Cf. id. at 298-300 (commenting that relaxation of MSM donor deferral policy will create 
risk, albeit small). 
 49. See generally Francine A. Hochberg, Note, HIV/AIDS and Blood Donation Policies: A 
Comparative Study of Public Health Policies and Individual Rights Norms, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 231 (2002) (listing exclusion policies of several other nations). 
 50. At least since 1992, “[p]ast or present intravenous drug users” have been excluded from 
the donor pool.  REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 17, at 3. 
 51. The CDC itself has stated that receptive anal intercourse presents about 100 times as 
great a risk of infection as insertive oral sex.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
Interpreting HIV Prevention into the Medical Care of Persons Living with HIV,  52 MORBIDITY 
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yourself” approach cannot be sound policy.  Second, employing the amorphous 
term “sex” as a disqualifier for all gay men compounds the problem addressed 
above.  This ambiguity furthers the stereotypical image of gay men as 
dangerous just because of their “gayness,” as opposed to any specifically high-
risk behavior.  As is well-established, different sexual activities carry different 
risks.52  However, the FDA’ s blunderbuss approach tramples all such 
distinctions, and, in the words of one astute commentator, “tends to screen 
donors on the basis of sexual orientation rather than on the basis of relative 
risk.”53 
III.  REPEATING THE ERROR: THE ANONYMOUS SPERM DONATION 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
On September 30, 1999, the FDA issued a proposed rule relating to donor 
suitability (later changed to “eligibility”) in the areas of human cells and 
tissues and their derivatives.54  After a protracted comment period, the Final 
Rule was issued on May 25, 2004; it will go into effect one year from that 
date.55  The subject of the present discussion is that portion of the rule relating 
to gay men who wish to become anonymous sperm donors.  Under the FDA’s 
Draft Guidance Document, men who have had sex with men during the past 
five years should be excluded from the donor pool.56  As will be demonstrated 
below, the FDA’s errors in this instance are different from those it has 
committed in the case of blood donations, but no less discriminatory and no 
more justified. 
It is important to begin by describing the different procedures for the 
collection and use of blood on the one hand and sperm on the other.  Blood 
from a donor is tested for HIV (and a host of other pathogens) and then, if 
unreactive, used for the benefit of one needing a transfusion.57  Thus, only one 
 
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/RR/ 
RR5212.pdf. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Letter from Jonathan Givner, Staff Attorney, Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, to Jill Warner, Regulatory Counsel to the Director, Center for Biologic Evaluation and 
Research 12 (Dec. 22, 2003) (on file with author). 
 54. Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,786, 29,786, 29,787, 29,797 (May 25, 2004) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 211, 820, 1271). 
 55. Id. at 29,786. 
 56. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS OF HUMAN CELLS, 
TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS (HCT/PS) 16 (2004), 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/tissdonor.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY]. 
 57. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 610.40(a), 640.5(f) (2004). 
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sample of blood is tested from any prospective donor.  Anonymous sperm 
donors, on the other hand, have their blood tested twice for HIV.  It is tested 
once at the time of donation, and then six months later, after a mandatory 
quarantine period during which the sperm is frozen.58  Thus, a donor who was 
newly infected with HIV at the time of initial donation might not test positive 
for the virus at the time of donation, but HIV (or antibodies to it) would appear 
when the donor’s blood was retested at the end of the quarantine period.59  In 
that case, the donor’s sperm would obviously not be used. 
This quarantine and re-testing, it must be emphasized, is a mandatory piece 
of the FDA’s process for ensuring the safety of the donated product, and was 
established precisely to deal with the window period issue.60  In 1999, the 
proposed regulations stated that the “retesting requirement is designed to 
address the ‘window period’ between the time of infection and the presence of 
detectable levels of antibodies to communicable diseases.”61  The FDA’s 
response to comments preceding the Final Rule reiterates this point.62  Given 
that the FDA’s own policy deals with the window period, the blanket exclusion 
of even remotely sexually active gay men would seem to require another 
justification.  Laboratory error is another source of concern, but the same 
double-testing requirement that addresses the window period also minimizes 
the possibility of lab error.63 
The FDA’s response to these observations is a masterpiece of unpersuasive 
circumlocution, striking more for its omissions than for the positive comments 
it makes.  The window period received a quick brush-off with the agency 
noting that even the best testing (for the virus itself) “may fail to detect early 
stage HIV” because of the low level of viremia.64  As to laboratory error, the 
FDA simply ignored the obvious fact that double-testing would render such 
mistakes far less likely.  Because of the imperfect nature of the tests 
themselves and the reporting of results, the agency concluded that screening 
 
 58. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 56, at 35. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 64 
Fed. Reg. 52,696, 52,706 (proposed Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 211, 
820, 1271). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,786, 29,800 (May 25, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 
210, 211, 820, 1271) (“The requirement to retest the donor . . . provide[s] an important added 
measure of protection by addressing the ‘window period’ between the time of infection and the 
presence of detectable levels of antigens and/or antibodies to communicable diseases and agents 
such as HIV.”). 
 63. Cf. supra note 60 and accompanying text (mandatory process). 
 64. Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,806. 
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for risk factors remained important.65  It then noted that the rule itself does not 
exclude donors based on risk, and referred to the Guidance Document for 
details on such exclusions.66 
The Guidance Document itself, in a May 2004 draft,67 sheds little light on 
the issue.  Although the FDA is accurate in stating that the “guidance” does not 
rise to the level of a command, establishments in the cell and tissue donation 
business “must” ask questions about the donor’s “relevant social behavior, 
including risk factors for . . .  communicable disease agents.”68  The FDA then 
states its continuing “belief” that certain “conditions and behaviors” indicate 
higher risk.69  Further, in the presence of one or more such factors, the FDA 
“recommend[s]” a determination of ineligibility.70  Although recommendations 
are, by definition, not requirements, it seems highly unlikely that any 
establishment that wished to retain its license would ignore them.71 
As previously noted, “men who have had sex with men in the preceding 
five years” are ineligible.72  Curiously, an exclusion relating to the MSM ban 
disqualifies “persons who have had sex in the preceding 12 months” with 
certain categories of other persons – including MSM.73  The inconsistency of 
these two provisions should be apparent.  If those who have had sexual 
relations with MSM are excluded for such a high-risk activity, why is this 
exclusion for one year only?  The answer cannot be that one year is a sufficient 
amount of time for the window to close, because that same argument would 
suffice for MSM (especially given the extremely low probability of testing and 
reporting errors when a donor’s blood is drawn and tested at two times, six 
months apart). 
One searches the Guidance Document and its supporting references in vain 
for further justification.  The FDA mentions two sources for its continuing 
five-year exclusion of MSM.  The first source is the ten-year-old 
Recommendation and Report issued by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”) entitled Guidelines for Preventing Transmission of 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Through Transplantation of Human Tissues 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 56. 
 68. Id. at 1, 16. 
 69. Id. at 16. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (statement of sperm bank director expressing 
fear that the FDA could shut down an establishment). 
 72. See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 56, at 16. 
 73. See id. 
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and Organs (“Prevention Guidelines”).74  The second source is a lengthy 
transcript from a December 2001 meeting of the FDA’s Blood Products 
Advisory Committee (“Advisory Committee”).75  As we shall see, neither 
document supports the FDA’s continued five-year exclusion of MSM. 
It is instructive to begin with the problems in organ donations to date that 
were identified in the Prevention Guidelines.  Since the advent of HIV-
antibody screening in 1985, the CDC has identified only four instances in 
which a donor whose HIV test was negative nonetheless transmitted HIV to a 
recipient.76  None of these cases describes a situation presented in the frozen 
sperm donation context.  In the first case, the required confirmatory test for 
HIV appears not to have been done.77  In the second, eight months were 
permitted to lapse between the HIV test and the donation – a wide window 
indeed for HIV; the donor may not even have been exposed to the virus at the 
time of testing.78  The third case involved an emergency condition in which 
there simply was not time to wait for the results of the test.79  This situation 
could never arise in the context of sperm donation.  The fourth case presented a 
true “window” problem.  A negative antibody test at the time of donation 
likely meant seroconversion between testing and donation.80  Again, the rules 
on frozen sperm eliminate this possibility because the donor must be tested at 
both the beginning and the end of the six-month period.81 
Consider what these cases mean: To date, the possibility of HIV infection 
by an MSM who has been tested twice is purely theoretical.  Although this fact 
does not mean that MSM do not pose a threat, it is useful to bear in mind that 
we are discussing a tiny, and so far, unrealized risk.  The question thus remains 
why MSM are subject to such a lengthy exclusion.  Alas, one reading these 
Prevention Guidelines in search of the justifications promised in the Draft 
Guidance Document is disappointed to find no such reasons.  Instead, the 
 
 74. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Guidelines for Preventing Transmission 
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Through Transplantation of Human Tissue and Organs, 43 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (1994), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/00031670.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Prevention 
Guidelines]. 
 75. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BLOOD 
PRODUCTS ADVISORY COMMITTEE 70TH MEETING (Dec. 14, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/ 
dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3817t2.doc (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE 70TH MEETING]. 
 76. Prevention Guidelines, supra note 74, at 2, 5. 
 77. See id. at 2. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 56, at 35. 
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Prevention Guidelines simply include MSM on the list of excluded donors,82 
and refer the by-now industrious reader to even earlier CDC sources that 
supposedly establish the risk posed by MSM.83  Three of these documents 
contain science that is almost (or, in one case, more than) twenty years old.84  
The earliest reference is from 1983, and the other two are from 1985 – at or 
before the dawn of HIV-antibody testing.85  An additional document refers to 
the risk of bone transplants.86  The final document, from 1988, although more 
than fifteen years old itself, is at least on the right subject: It is the CDC’s own 
release, entitled Perspectives in Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, 
Semen Banking, Organ and Tissue Transplantation and HIV Antibody 
Testing.87  But this brief document does no more than restate the importance of 
freezing the sperm of anonymous donors so that it may be tested before and 
after the six-month quarantine period, and then refers back to one of the 1985 
documents for a discussion of the risk issue.88 
In short, to seek the source of the Draft Guidance recommendations in the 
Prevention Guidelines is to embark on a spiraling journey back through time, 
with no independent justification for the continued ban from any source since 
1985.  At least the other cited support for the ban, the Advisory Committee 
 
 82. Prevention Guidelines, supra note 74, at 12. 
 83. Id. at 15. 
 84. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Current Trends Prevention of 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Report of Inter-Agency Recommendations, 32 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 101-3 (1983), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001257.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Current 
Trends Prevention]; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Provisional Public Health 
Service Inter-Agency Recommendations for Screening Donated Blood and Plasma for Antibody 
to the Virus Causing Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REP. 1-5 (1985), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ 
00033029.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Provisional Public Health]; CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Testing Donors of Organs, 
Tissues, and Semen for Antibody to Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-
Associated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 294 (1985), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000547.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) 
[hereinafter Epidemiologic Notes]. 
 85. See Current Trends Prevention, supra note 84; Provisional Public Health, supra note 84; 
Epidemiologic Notes, supra note 84. 
 86. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Epidemiologic Notes and Reports 
Transmission of HIV Through Bone Transplantation: Case Report and Public Health 
Recommendations, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 597-99 (1988), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001284.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 87. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Perspectives in Disease Prevention and 
Health Promotion, Semen Banking, Organ and Tissue Transplantation, and HIV Antibody 
Testing, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 57-58, 63 (1988), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001037.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 88. Id. 
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transcript, is of more recent vintage.  The Advisory Committee met in 
December 2001 to consider, among a group of questions, whether data were 
available to identify subgroups of MSM whose prevalence of HIV infection 
was closer to that of the general population.89  With the question thus framed, 
the committee (doubtless influenced by a lengthy presentation by a CDC 
scientist who found high levels of HIV prevalence in young gay men) 
answered “no.”90 
In the waning minutes of a day-long session, however, several speakers 
expressed confusion and frustration over the way the question had been 
framed.91  Alternative questions were raised, but not voted on, in part because 
it was not always clear whether the speakers were discussing anonymous or 
directed sperm donations.92  One committee member, however, got closest to 
the proper question: “[Can] [e]xisting screening questions, laboratory tests and 
quarantine procedures . . . be used to identify a subset of men who have had 
sex with other men in which the prevalence rate of HIV . . . of the subjects is 
similar to that of the public?”93 
Note that the question weaves together all of the strands of the safety net 
rather than focusing on any one.  This approach reflects common sense, 
inasmuch as donor questioning is the least reliable component of the screening 
process.94  This point was as much as conceded by Dr. Linda Valleroy of the 
CDC at the meeting discussed in the text.  In discussing a body of unpublished 
data, she noted that 883 out of four million first-time blood donors had tested 
positive for HIV, yielding a prevalence of .02%.95  Of the 521 of the donors 
that the researchers were able to track down, some striking facts emerged.  
First, 34% of them had simply failed to report risks that, had they been 
disclosed, would have resulted in deferral.96  This group would include but is 
not limited to MSM and shows that the screening allows people whom the 
CDC deems to be high risk to slip through, yet the rate of HIV infection 
through sperm donation is almost zero.97  Another 22% of these 521 HIV-
positive donors had risks that were non-deferrable, such as having had sex with 
an intravenous drug user, an MSM, or a commercial sex worker.98  As 
previously noted, this begs the question of why such donors are not considered 
 
 89. ADVISORY COMMITTEE 70TH MEETING, supra note 75. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (comments of Dr. Stroncek). 
 94. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE 70TH MEETING, supra note 75. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
 98. ADVISORY COMMITTEE 70TH MEETING, supra note 75. 
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to pose unacceptably high risks, especially since MSM are.99  Then followed 
the most astounding statement of all: “[A]nother 44[%] had no reportable risk, 
and this breaks down to that a certain percentage of them had had unprotected 
heterosexual sex which . . . is . . . just not considered a risk.”100  This 
conclusion obviously relies on comparative prevalence to the exclusion of 
biological reality;101 unprotected heterosexual sex of course presents a risk of 
HIV transmission.102  And note that the absolute number of HIV-infected 
people slipping through the donor screening process substantially exceeds the 
number of MSM who donated. 
As for the quarantining of sperm and the re-testing of donors, the statement 
of Dr. Charles Sims, the founder and co-director of a sperm bank organized 
almost thirty years ago,103 was revealing.  While the practices of blood-banking 
vary, those described by Dr. Sims offer strong comfort to those fearing 
window period or processing issues.  Significantly, sperm donation bears little 
resemblance to blood donation, where the contact between the donor and the 
blood bank is fleeting; the donor gives blood and leaves, usually with no 
follow-up.104  Sperm donors, on the other hand, are typically seen for donations 
several times per week, thereby establishing the predicate for an on-going 
relationship.105  Moreover, Dr. Sims laid out a blood testing and sperm release 
schedule that goes well beyond what the FDA requires.  First, the donors are 
tested and screened through a questionnaire at three-month intervals, not every 
six months.106  After six months, the earliest specimen can be released 
(assuming three consecutive negative tests), but, in Dr. Sims’s words, one 
specimen is “not enough inventory to release, so it’s impractical.”107  
Therefore, the nine-month screening and blood testing – by now the fourth 
 
 99. See supra notes 69-73. 
 100. ADVISORY COMMITTEE 70TH MEETING, supra note 75. 
 101. Indeed, the director of a sperm bank in California directly questioned the relevance of 
the prevalence data among sexually active young men to “men in their 30s and 40s who are in 
long-term mutually monogamous relationships.  In fact, to take that number defies any sort of 
scientific mind-set or dignity.”  Id. 
 102. Indeed, on a world-wide basis the number of women who are carrying HIV has almost 
equaled the number of men; most of these women were infected through heterosexual sex.  In 
July 2004, a consortium of international organizations, including the United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), released a report which revealed that 48% of all HIV-infected persons 
worldwide are women.  See UNAIDS, UNFPA & UNIFEM, WOMEN & HIV/AIDS: 
CONFRONTING THE CRISIS 1 (2004), available at http://www.unfpa.org/hiv/women/docs/ 
women_aids.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 103. Dr. Sims founded the California Cryobank in 1977.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE 70TH 
MEETING, supra note 75. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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such process, is the critical one.  Once a donor tests negative at nine months, 
the “inventory” from the first three months can be released.108 
Dr. Sims also addressed the custodial issues that worry the FDA.  It 
emerges from this presentation that the on-going contact, repeated testing, 
specimen storage and record-keeping make the sort of serious error that could 
result in HIV infection extremely unlikely.109  Further, Dr. Sims likely spoke 
for many licensees in expressing an additional incentive for careful 
compliance: “The fear, always, of course, is that we’re like a little insect in the 
forest and the FDA is the big elephant that comes on and steps on us without 
even seeing us.”110 
In short, the FDA has failed to come to grips with the central and difficult 
issue of whether the exclusion of MSM from the sperm donor pool actually 
presents an unacceptable risk to recipients.  Stating that the prevalence of HIV 
infection among gay men is higher than the prevalence among the general 
heterosexual population does not answer that question.  If it did, we would be 
forced to ask what most people would rightly regard as unacceptable questions 
about, for example, the suitability of women of color as blood, organ or tissue 
donors, among whom the incidence of HIV infection in the United States is 
rising at the highest rate of all.111 
These comments are not made to suggest that potential donors should not 
be screened for behaviors that spike the risk of HIV and other serious 
infections to unacceptably high levels.  But the blanket exclusion of all gay 
men (as a practical matter) from the sperm donation pool, regardless of specific 
behavior, sero-status, or other demographic indicators, is nothing more than 
discrimination in the guise of public health policy.  In the final section of this 
Article, I tie this policy to other governmental actions and policies that devalue 
the GLBT community, and offer a few preliminary suggestions for a more 
nuanced kind of donor screening process. 
IV.  TOWARDS A SOUNDER PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY FOR MSM 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the continued exclusions of 
MSM from the blood and sperm donation pools are the results of deliberately 
discriminatory policy.  Even if they are well-intentioned, however, their effect 
on the GLBT community is the same: to reduce confidence in public health.  
That effect is more likely because the exclusion is but one strand in a web of 
 
 108. ADVISORY COMMITTEE 70TH MEETING, supra note 75. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Cf. Jennifer Barrs, Sexual Secrets, Risky Deceits, TAMPA TRIB., June 24, 2004, Baylife, 
at 1 (summarizing CDC’s 2002 study that showed black women now account for 34% of AIDS 
cases). 
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policy decisions – some clearly articulated, others less visible – that treat the 
community with scant respect.  The remarks that follow describe two 
seemingly unrelated areas.  Yet, it is precisely because the subjects are at such 
a distance from each other that the point about the suppression of the GLBT 
community resonates so powerfully. 
Last year, a disturbing story came to light that shows the effect of political 
meddling on the mission of science.  According to stories published on the 
same day in both The New York Times and the journal Science, officials at the 
National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) have been warning scientists seeking 
funding to avoid a list of words that might bring unwanted scrutiny from 
conservative members of Congress.112  According to these NIH officials (who 
have been wise in providing this advice behind the scenes), the list of words 
and phrases is long and troubling: “gay”; “homosexual”; “transgender”; “men 
who have sex with men”; “needle exchange”; “condom effectiveness”; 
“commercial sex workers”; and, related only by political agenda, “abortion.”113  
Thus, scientists have gotten creative in describing their research goals while 
avoiding these words.  As one unnamed researcher at the University of 
California noted, though, when the proposal is for funding of a study of gay 
men and HIV testing, “[i]t’s hard not to mention [those words] in your 
abstract.”114  The NIH’s clandestine advice was apparently sound; just a few 
months after these stories ran, the NIH was asked by a congressional 
committee to “justify” its decisions (reached as the result of rigorous peer 
review) to fund some two hundred projects relating to sexuality, sexual 
orientation, or HIV prevention.115  One researcher named on fourteen of the 
“hit list” grants aptly termed the general feeling in the scientific community as 
“one of fear and intimidation.”116 
Of course, it is fundamentally unfair to blame public health officials for 
this sorry state of affairs; the NIH, after all, was trying to assist the research 
community through these warnings.  Yet these ameliorative actions are 
unlikely to dispel the sense of exclusion and demonization that the GLBT 
community (among others) experiences in such a climate – worse, public 
health officials will be seen as part of the problem.  Seen in this light, the 
FDA’s continued exclusion of MSM from the blood and sperm donation pools 
 
 112. Erica Goode, Certain Words Can Trip Up AIDS Grants, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 18, 2003, at A10; Jocelyn Kaiser, Studies of Gay Men, Prostitutes Come Under Scrutiny, 
300 SCIENCE 403, 403 (2003). 
 113. See Goode, supra note 112; Kaiser, supra note 112. 
 114. Goode, supra note 112. 
 115. See ASSOCIATION OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, “HIT LIST” TARGETS 
SCIENTISTS STUDYING HIV PREVENTION, SEXUALITY, at http://www.arhp.org/corevalues/ 
examples.cfm (last updated Oct. 16, 2004). 
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is both a product of understandable fear of political reprisal and a sad 
contribution to the problem of mistrust. 
Further, recent legal and political developments have provided further fuel 
for the GLBT community’s sense of outsider status.  In particular, the political 
effort to ban same-sex marriage – through an amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, no less – is dispiriting in the extreme.  Countless thousands of 
gay, lesbian and transgendered families throughout the nation have seen, in 
stark ugliness, the extremism of politicians who tie the drive for legal 
recognition to the destruction of the institution of marriage.  The recent 
hearings in the United States Senate on the Federal Marriage Amendment only 
underscored that this ugly movement rests solely on rhetoric and fear.  Actual 
arguments in opposition have been limited to unsuccessful efforts to establish a 
correlation between same-sex marriage and the collapse of the overall 
institution of marriage.117  Worse, these opponents offer no alternative legal 
recourse to couples and families who are, in all material respects, leading lives 
parallel to those of legally married couples118 – but without any of the legal 
protections, and, significantly, without the approbation marriage confers. 
Given this backdrop, it is even more imperative for the FDA to sweep 
away the absurdly overbroad MSM exclusions for those who wish to donate 
blood and sperm.  Especially in the case of blood donation, denial of this 
opportunity insults and diminishes those gay men who wish to make this 
altruistic gesture.  Donating blood is an intimate and, for some, a defining act 
of charity, kindness, and connection to those in need.  It is therefore especially 
important for public health policy to exclude only those potential donors who 
pose a risk in excess of what is otherwise routinely acceptable.  The brief 
remarks that follow sketch out a few baseline rules and assumptions that 
should guide policy revision. 
As one speaker during the Advisory Committee meeting stated, the first 
step is to realize that screening provides false comfort.119  Dr. Valleroy’s report 
 
 117. A debate that captures the opposing viewpoints can be found in the CNN program Lou 
Dobbs Tonight where Sens. Barbara Boxer and Sam Brownback faced off.  Lou Dobbs Tonight 
(CNN television broadcast, July 14, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/0407/14/ldt.01.html) (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 118. A recent report by the Williams Project at UCLA School of Law revealed that same-sex 
couples in California had many of the same financial and economic issues as their opposite-sex 
counterparts, but obviously without the legal protection afforded by marriage.  Moreover, some 
70,000 children in the state were being raised by same-sex couples.  These children were more 
likely to be under five, of color, adopted, and disabled than those being raised by opposite-sex 
couples.  See R. BRADLEY SEARS & M.V. LEE BADGETT, WILLIAMS PROJECT, UCLA SCHOOL OF 
LAW, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND SAME-SEX COUPLES RAISING CHILDREN IN CALIFORNIA 2 
(2004), available at http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~williamsproj/publications/CA-SSCouples.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
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cements the point; HIV-infected blood donors are slipping through the 
screen.120  Thus, a re-imagining of the purpose and limits of screening is in 
order: Instead of excluding broad categories of people based on ancient and 
irrelevant conduct, the process should be seen as an opportunity for education 
and intervention.  Potential donors should be asked about their health and their 
relevant risk behavior in a private and supportive setting.  Those whose 
conduct indicates a high degree of risk within a relevant time period – men 
who have had unprotected anal sex with men; those who have injected drugs; 
those engaging in heterosexual sex who have had multiple partners – should be 
urged to have their blood tested for HIV and other infectious, blood-borne 
diseases (particularly variants of hepatitis), assuming they are unaware of their 
status with regard to these pathogens. Blood and sperm donation centers could 
develop an important role in testing and counseling for HIV.  Then, if a 
sufficiently specific risk exists, potential donors should be encouraged to return 
if and when the window of infection has closed. 
In the case of blood donation, this temporary exclusion is necessary 
because of the continuing presence of the window period.  Strictly speaking, 
deferral should not be needed in the case of sperm donation, but practicalities 
counsel a different result.  Sperm recipients are not in the same life-or-death 
situation as blood recipients often are; an excess of caution, anchored in 
principles of consent,121 is probably the correct approach. Thus, a similar 
deferral period seems appropriate. 
Forever deferring men who have had “sex” (undefined) since 1977 with 
men is pure discrimination.  The five-year ban in the case of sperm donation is 
little better.  With the presence of better testing and the concomitant shorter 
window period, one year would likely be safe.  Two years would be fastidious, 
but arguably justified.  Further, any period of exclusion that is decided upon 
must be applied with an even hand to those whose behavior – not their status – 
has placed them at risk.  A more focused definition of “sex” could be part of 
the conversation that trained blood and sperm bank personnel conduct with 
potential donors.  “Sex” that poses little or no risk should occasion no concern, 
and should not be the basis for any period of deferral. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. The consent here is a fiction, because the recipient may not be informed in detail about 
the screening and testing process and its reliability.  The idea is that the recipient justifiably relies 
on the sperm or blood bank to safeguard the blood supply, so that any change in policy can only 
be supported if it would not compromise that safety in a way that a reasonable person would 
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The lifetime exclusion of men who have sex with men from donations of 
blood, tissue, and organs is an artifact of a policy that lacks current 
justification.  While the focus of concern has often been on the rights of 
potential donors,122 this article has emphasized the public health costs of 
overbroad exclusion: no additional protection of the blood, tissue and organ 
supply on the one hand; mistrust of public health on the other.  Such a lack of 
trust has effects far beyond the immediate problem of blood and sperm 
donations, as it compromises the ability of public health to gain support for 
sound initiatives.  This point has been insufficiently appreciated.  The FDA has 
seen the exclusion as a win-win situation: increased safety at no cost.  But this 
view overlooks the problem of unintended consequences.  Ripples from this 
controversy extend far beyond the policies in place, entail too high a cost to the 
mission of public health, and offer little, if any, compensating benefit.  The 
FDA must amend these exclusions immediately. 
 
 122. For an article that nicely summarizes and defends the constitutional arguments for blood 
donors’ rights, see Michael Christian Belli, The Constitutionality of the “Men Who Have Sex With 
Men” Blood Donor Exclusion Policy, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 315 (2003). 
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